AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SIZING CONSTRAINTS: PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND CHANGES IN WELFARE UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY SODA BAN by Bourquard, Brian A.
Purdue University
Purdue e-Pubs
Open Access Theses Theses and Dissertations
Spring 2014
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SIZING
CONSTRAINTS: PRICE DISCRIMINATION
AND CHANGES IN WELFARE UNDER THE
NEW YORK CITY SODA BAN
Brian A. Bourquard
Purdue University
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_theses
Part of the Education Economics Commons, and the Nutrition Commons
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.
Recommended Citation
Bourquard, Brian A., "AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SIZING CONSTRAINTS: PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND CHANGES
IN WELFARE UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY SODA BAN" (2014). Open Access Theses. 158.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_theses/158
Graduate School ETD Form 9 








For the degree of   
Is approved by the final examining committee: 
  
To the best of my knowledge and as understood by the student in the 
C Disclaimer (Graduate School Form ), this thesis/dissertation
Purdue University’s “Policy on Integrity in Research” and the use of 
copyrighted material.  
Approved by Major Professor(s): ____________________________________ 
        ____________________________________ 
 Approved by:
Head of the Graduate Program    Date
Brian Anderson Bourquard
              
An Economic Analysis Of Sizing Constraints: Price Discrimination And Changes In Welfare 
Under The New York City Soda Ban
Master of Science
Steven Y. Wu, Ph.D.
Raymond J.G.M. Florax, Ph.D.
Joseph V. Balagtas, Ph.D.
Steven Y. Wu, Ph.D.





 AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SIZING CONSTRAINTS: PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND 
CHANGES IN WELFARE UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY SODA BAN 
A Thesis 




Brian A. Bourquard 
In Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree 
of 
Master of Science 
 
May 2014  
Purdue University 















I want to acknowledge the support provided by Purdue University and the 
Department of Agricultural Economics, without whose generosity and dedication, I 
would not have received such an incredible education. 
I would especially like to thank Dr. Wu, for his willingness to guide my work, and 
his honesty and constancy.  I will be forever grateful for his assistance and dedication, 








TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Page 
LIST OF SYMBOLS ................................................................................................................. v 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................ vi 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANT LITERATURE ............................................ 1 
CHAPTER 2. THE MODEL ............................................................................................... 15 
2.1 Without The Ban ........................................................................................................... 17 
2.1.1 Case I ........................................................................................................................ 19 
2.1.2 Case II ....................................................................................................................... 21 
2.2 With The Ban ................................................................................................................ 22 
2.2.1 Case A ....................................................................................................................... 24 
2.2.2 Case B ....................................................................................................................... 25 
2.2.3 Case C ....................................................................................................................... 25 
2.3 Pricing Strategy And Profits .......................................................................................... 27 
2.4 Welfare Impacts ........................................................................................................... 30 
CHAPTER 3. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION ................................................................ 36 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 42 






LIST OF SYMBOLS 
θH – High-type consumer 
θL – Low-type consumer 
β – Proportion of low type consumers in the population 
U(i, q) – Utility function for consumer type i and quantity q 
pi – Price paid by consumer type i 
qi – Quantity purchased by consumer type i 
  
  – Optimal quantity for consumer type i 
   –  Maximum soda size permitted under a ban 











Bourquard, Brian A., M.S., Purdue University, May 2014.  An Economic Analysis of Sizing 
Constraints: Price Discrimination and Changes in Welfare Under the New York City Soda 
Ban. Major Professor: Dr. Steven Wu. 
 
 
This thesis uses profit maximizing techniques and nonlinear, second-degree price 
discrimination theory to describe changes in consumption and gains and losses in 
welfare of consumption under a container size constraint.  It observationally examines 
the New York City soda ban to provide insight into retailer behavior in the event of such 
a ban, and examines three cases to highlight potential retailer decisions to compensate 
for a ban: to continue using a restricted menu of pricing options; to sell only to high type 
soda consumers; or to serve both markets with a one-size-fits-all strategy.  This thesis 
finds that the ban generally reduces aggregate consumption welfare, without 
addressing losses in consumer choice – retailers will profit less, low type consumers will 
continue to capture zero or near zero surplus, and high type consumers experience 
changes in welfare dependent on the case.  In one case they experience a loss of 
captured surplus, in one case they experience no change, and in a third case, they 
experience an ambiguous change.  Soda consumption generally declines in two of the 
examined cases.  As sweetened beverage consumption is directly linked to obesity, 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANT LITERATURE 
This thesis explores pricing mechanisms in the presence of beverage size constraints, 
a form of market intervention, in order to better understand retailer profit-maximizing 
behavior.  Bans restricting sales by size or quantity effectively reduce producers’ and 
retailers’ abilities to engage in nonlinear pricing schemes.  This thesis develops a second-
degree price discrimination model to analyze likely outcomes of the ban on price and 
quantity combinations and the resulting changes in the welfare of consumption.  To 
illustrate the model, the thesis uses as an example the New York City Soda Ban (“ban”), 
which intended to prohibit food service establishments regulated by the city health 
department from selling sugar-sweetened beverages in sizes larger than sixteen ounces.  
The ban applied to any establishment (“retailers”) in which individual portions of food 
were provided directly to the consumer and which receives a health-grade from the City 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, including fast-food establishments and 
restaurants.  Not included were supermarkets and convenience stores.  The soda ban 
was struck-down by the courts in March of 2013, a decision subsequently upheld upon 
appeal the following July.  The ban is currently under review by the New York State 





After exploring the relevant literature, the thesis sets up a standard model of a 
profit-maximizing firm facing two types of consumers, low types and high types: low 
types      who consume relatively small amounts of soda and, high types      who 
consume large amounts of soda.  By simplifying the market in such a way, this analysis is 
able to focus on retailers’ decisions regarding which consumer type to serve.  Currently, 
in the absence of government imposed size constraints, retailers serve both consumer 
groups.  This thesis explores three potential cases under the size constraint: that the 
retailer continues to serve both consumer groups through a menu of options; that the 
retailer serves both consumer groups through a one-size-fits-all strategy; or, that the 
retailer serves only one consumer group with one size.  To do this, the thesis sets up the 
first order Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the profit maximization function and then explores 
profit levels at the various outcomes.  The thesis then analyzes the effect of a ban on 
economic welfare of retailers and consumers.  Each case under the ban is tested against 
the unrestricted menu of options currently observed in the market to determine 
impacts on the welfare of consumption and retailer profit.   
The soda ban was a change in the city’s health policy, which combined with other 
changes such as bans of trans-fats and public smoking was intended to lead to greater 
social health.  Overall, given the many regulatory changes to food and tobacco products 
under Mayor Bloomberg, the city may be attempting to induce healthy behavior among 
its citizens.  As the courts invalidated the law for its method of implementation, it is 
possible that it could be reintroduced through the legislative process as opposed to 





California, and it is possible that attempts to restrict or discourage consumption of 
sweetened drinks will likely continue. 
Interest in public health issues has been growing steadily, and health care played a 
critical role in the United States’ 2012 elections.  With growing overweight and obesity 
problems in the United States and across OECD countries (Triall, 2012), policy makers 
have been looking for ways to reduce healthcare costs.  For many years, information 
campaigns, such as anti-smoking advertisements, played a key role in changing 
consumer behavior.  Now, many policy makers are seeking more active ways to 
discourage unhealthy consumption, including size constraints and taxes. 
Concurrently, consumers, retailers, producers, and consumer advocates point out 
that individuals should be free to engage in consumption behavior of their own choice.  
Many of the arguments against the ban are not predicated on its lack of efficacy or flaws, 
but against government intrusion into the lives of consumers.  Policy makers, they argue, 
are engaging in overly paternalistic behavior resulting in reduced market diversity, 
restrictions on business, and reduced freedom of choice. 
To explore the ban’s impacts on the welfare of consumption, this thesis uses 
traditional profit maximization techniques.  It also uses comparative statics to 
understand how changes in policy, changes in population, or changes in preferences can 
affect price and quantity combinations.  This thesis does not address bundling or 
substitutions.  As only certain classes of establishments are subject to the ban, 
consumers could choose to shop at retailers who are unaffected or to substitute 





analysis.  The thesis specifically addresses the concerns of ban opponents and their 
claim that consumers are made worse off through a reduction in their freedom to 
consume large-sized sodas.  It does not quantitatively address health within the context 
of the model.  Instead, changes in welfare are related specifically to consumption and 
retailer profit. 
As policy makers continue to explore various mechanisms, economic studies can 
help illuminate both the intended and unintended consequences of policy prescriptions.  
Health policies restricting or discouraging unhealthy consumption behavior will continue 
to play a key role in the foreseeable future and public discussion may be better 
informed through a more rigorous, model based approach to understanding changes in 
price-quantity combinations, and total welfare.  This thesis attempts to add to the 
conversation by building on known pricing literature and analyzing changes in the 
welfare of consumption. 
The analysis relies on traditional price discrimination theory as laid out by Jean 
Tirole in his book “The Theory of Industrial Organization” (1988).  Tirole lays out the 
framework for second-degree price discrimination by first establishing its rough 
definition: when a producer (or retailer) sells the same good at different prices to either 
the same consumer or different consumers.  Tirole points out that the definition is not 
all encompassing of potential price discriminations; however, it covers the concept of 
price discrimination explored in this thesis, soda being a non-differentiated good being 





Sellers may have some market power to set prices such that they can capture consumer 
surplus and must incent consumers to reveal their hidden type. 
Much of the work in understanding nonlinear pricing theory can be traced back to 
Myerson (1979) who expounds upon information asymmetries and incentive 
compatibility pay-offs; Myerson’s work is critical in understanding pricing schemes in 
the presence of hidden information.  This thesis sets up a model by which consumers 
will self-select, and hence reveal their type, based on a menu of options provided by 
producers who have no a priori knowledge of the consumer’s type.  The work of 
Myerson can be traced back to work by Gibbard (1973) who demonstrated manipulation 
of outcomes through misrepresentation of preferences. 
Hidden information results in agents maximizing their utility in the market by 
keeping their type, or willingness to pay, hidden from principals.  This adverse selection 
problem can be overcome by producers through pricing schemes to create incentive 
compatibility – in other words, they will pay an information rent to consumers with 
higher willingness to pay in order to entice them to purchase their intended price-
quantity combination.  Soda retailers’ goal is to sell as much soda as possible at the 
highest price possible, and they can sell more soda using a menu of sizes and second-
degree price discrimination, thereby increasing profits over a linear pricing scheme. 
Second-degree price discrimination relies on the work of Mussa and Rossen (1978) 
who point to the necessity to pay high willingness to pay consumers to purchase their 
intended bundle.  Mussa and Rossen point out that a monopolist can extract further 





to pay consumers – thus offering them a second best option.  By offering a second best 
option to low type consumers, the producer can offer high willingness to pay consumers 
a quality equal to their first best option.  In the case of soda sales, producers reduce the 
size of the offering for low type consumers to their second-best option in order to 
reduce the information rents to the high type consumers.  This creates the conditions 
necessary for incentive compatibility – each consumer type will purchase the bundle 
intended specifically for them. 
Incentive compatibility relies on the revelation principle, as expounded on by 
Myerson (1979), Baron and Myerson (1982), and others, which generally states that 
when incentive-compatibility is possible (equilibriums exist) principals can design 
mechanisms that incent agents to reveal their types.  Because consumers given an 
opportunity to maximize their own utility will do so in any given situation, producers are 
motivated to provide incentives to consumers to purchase their intended price-quantity 
combinations.  Under conditions of a ban, which does not account for producers’ desires 
to maximize profit, producers will arrange the price-quantity combinations to extract as 
much of the social welfare as remains.  In doing so, the ban may reduce total welfare by 
impacting consumer surplus, through reduced soda consumption, and may reduce 
retailer surplus through reduced sales.  Reduced soda consumption is a possible 
outcome of the policy; however, it is important to note that this thesis explores the 
welfare of consumption – that is, that retailers and consumers welfare is explicitly tied 





from their consumption of soda, while retailer welfare is defined as their profits from 
the sales of soda. 
An important look at the application of setting quantity to maximize profits comes 
from Maskin and Riley (1984) who explore monopolist pricing under conditions of 
asymmetric information.  They confirm that under any situation in which consumers are 
required to self-identify, that providing low willingness to pay consumers with a less 
than first best option allows the monopolist to provide a first best option to high 
willingness to pay consumers.  In their analysis, marginal changes in quantity provided 
to low type consumers may have near zero impacts on profit, while providing first best 
options and maximizing quantities to high willingness to pay consumers has a first-order 
impact on profit levels, in order to entice high willingness to pay consumers to purchase 
their intended bundle. 
Overall, the pricing literature is well suited to analyze the cases presented in this 
thesis.  The final methodological review is from Kuhn and Tucker (1951) who lay out the 
necessary and sufficient conditions to determine maximum values of any given function 
and set of constraints.  The Kuhn-Tucker method is employed in this thesis to determine 
saddle points maximizing the producers’ profit functions subject to an incentive 
compatibility constraint, participation constraint, and a size constraint in the case of a 
ban. 
The literature discussed above provides the framework for the quantitative 





mentioned above, which demonstrates the traditional methodology for analyzing 
second-degree price discrimination.   
While the pricing literature is well developed, the literature on food bans is sparse.  
There are no known papers specifically addressing changes in price-quantity 
combinations and welfare changes after an imposed size constraint.  In a recent article, 
Wilson, Stolarz-Fantino, and Fantino (2013) elaborated on unintended consequences of 
limiting sugary drink sizes.  Using a behavioral simulation, they offered participants 
various drink menus without mentioning the presence of a size ban.  In cases in which 
participants were offered bundles of smaller soda, the total ounces of which added up 
to one large soda, total ounces of soda consumed were greater than when a menu of 
sizes were presented.  Their paper also examined the New York City soda ban, and 
found that it may not result in reduced consumption when retailers or producers are 
able to offer a bundle of sodas that add up to the original size.  Conversely, the total 
purchased ounces of soda may actually increase, giving retailers an incentive to bundle 
sodas.  The authors even report that revenues could be higher under bundling of smaller 
sodas than under a menu of unrestricted options.  This may be slightly counter-intuitive, 
as producers should be incented to provide this option at present, something not 
observed in the market, implying it does not adequately explain the decision to offer 
unrestricted menus of price-quantity combinations.  It does, however, illuminate the 
potential unintended and not fully understood consequences of a sizing constraint. 
In an unconstrained market, package size is an important factor in purchase and use 





in relation to usage volumes in branded products.  He hypothesizes that larger package 
sizes encourage greater usage per usage event, and that a portion of the use is related 
to the perceived unit cost of the product.  Using four laboratory and one field study, 
Wansink concluded that large package sizes result in increased product use, even when 
package size is separate from product supply (how full a package is).  He also finds that 
usage is influenced by perceived unit costs – when unit costs are lower usage per event 
increases.  For consumers, package size provides inferred information regarding unit 
cost – the larger the package the lower the perceived unit costs.  For managers, 
providing a larger package size or multipack offerings may increase purchases and usage 
frequency.  From a policy perspective, Wansink addresses the problems of overdosing, 
consuming more of something than is healthy due to a desire to reduce waste.  
Packaging sodas in larger quantities may encourage exactly this behavior, up to a point.  
In other words: larger package sizes increase consumption. 
While Wansink addressing consumptive behavior related to package size, Cohen 
(2008) examines pricing in the paper towel market using empirical and counter-factual 
analyses.  He finds that between 34 and 46 percent of price discounts based on quantity 
are consistent with price discrimination, while the remaining quantity price discounts 
are due to cost savings.  Additionally, competition among producers in the multi-roll 
market increases consumer surplus, implying consumers benefit from greater price-
quantity combinations.  Thus, a restriction in price-quantity combinations for consumer 
products may result in reduced welfare when starting from an unrestricted status-quo.  





that pricing mechanisms related to package size are designed consistent with second-
degree price discrimination, two conditions necessary for this thesis’s conclusions.  In 
addition to market constraints, many authors have explored concerns related to 
consumer knowledge and taxes and their impacts on consumption. 
Zheng, McLaughlin, and Kaiser (2012) found that consumer knowledge regarding 
taxes has important impacts on consumption of food and beverages.  In cases of sales 
tax, which is not listed in the shelf price, increases in tax had no impact on consumption; 
on the other hand, increases in excise taxes, which are typically passed onto consumers 
and listed in the shelf price, decreased demand in a similar fashion to price changes.  
This study is illuminating in its potential treatment of “fat taxes,” imposed to reduce 
consumption of products that have negative health impacts. 
The potential for taxes to reduce consumption of unhealthy products was also 
explored in conjunction with their regressive nature on the poor.  Madden (2013) finds 
that taxes on unhealthy food and beverage products have a greater impact on the poor, 
a population group with a greater concentration of obesity.  Madden does not discuss 
the potential substitutions that occur or the impact on consumer health under a ‘fat-tax’ 
regime.  He also avoids the issue of whether or not rising obesity levels indicate a 
market failure that demands government intervention. 
Substitutions, which are not addressed in this thesis, are important in their 
potential consequences for health policy.  Miao et al. (2013) find that when substitution 
within food groups is not accounted for in taxes on high-sugar, high-fat food products, 





overstated.  Consumers may substitute alternative items or shop at unaffected retailers 
for those being taxed, implying that there is little change in overall calorie consumption.  
The New York City soda ban constrains size only for items purchased through specific 
distribution channels: retailers subject to health grading by the City’s Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene.  As consumers have an alternative to purchase soda 
elsewhere, this raises some concerns about the efficacy of the policy in fighting obesity. 
In a qualitative approach, Loewenstein, Brennan, and Volpp (2007) develop 
concepts of Asymmetric Paternalism, the idea that various activities, such as purchasing 
food, can be designed in such a way so as to encourage healthy behaviors.  They do not 
advocate bans or explicit enforcement mechanisms, but instead rely on environmental 
design to reinforce healthy behaviors, such as putting healthy foods first in a lunch line 
or replacing large sodas with water or juice as the default option in fast food menus.  
They do not present evidence to indicate the efficacy of such solutions, but they 
progress the discussion by addressing it from an alternative angle that does not demand 
restrictions on “freedom” of choice enjoyed by consumers and retailers.  Alternatively, 
some researchers find that retailers may induce suboptimal social outcomes through 
their practice of super-sizing. 
Dobson and Gerstner (2010) demonstrate the use of super-sizing portions and 
pricing incentive systems to encourage consumers to purchase larger portions, and 
hence to overeat.  They show that producers and retailers profit handsomely from this 
practice.  They also posit that the practice erodes social welfare as the costs required to 





they advocate finding ways to discourage the practice of extra-large portioning and 
encourage consumers to choose smaller portions.  While their paper is interesting, it 
reads as if written from an ideological perspective, without appropriate academic 
detachment.  Another perspective for reducing unhealthy consumption is through 
consumer education – specifically labeling.  The technique was used with some success 
in the cigarette market, although less work has been done to assess its efficacy in food 
and drink markets. 
Lusk and Marette (2010) use multiple techniques to estimate consumers’ 
willingness to pay in the presence of labels and food-bans.  They use livestock cloning 
and methyl-mercury in fish in their studies, but demonstrate the varying magnitude of 
results depending on the empirical application chosen, although the sign of the change 
is consistent across their studies.  While this thesis is not empirical, the Lusk and 
Marette study demonstrates the potential challenges in understanding the magnitude 
of the impact of a soda ban, even when we can understand the direction of the change.  
This indicates the complexity of assessing how consumers respond to food and drink 
information and bans, particularly in relation to health. 
 Obesity, due to its associated health conditions, often demands attention from 
policy makers, intent on finding solutions.   In developed nations, the problems are 
particularly prominent, while developing nations continue to see increasing obesity as a 
negative health outcome.  Faulkner et al. (2011) used a Delphi survey of experts and a 
systematic literature review and found consistent evidence that weight is responsive to 





however, they note that independently of other actions, a tax may not be highly 
effective.  Instead, a tax may be more efficacious when coupled with subsidies for 
healthy foods and a review of agricultural policies encouraged at providing healthy food 
options.  Regardless of healthier alternatives, there is a strong link between diet, obesity, 
and injurious metabolic syndromes. 
 Significant research has been devoted to the relationship between obesity and 
chronic health conditions.  Several researchers elucidate the connection, including 
Lustig (2010), who posits the parallels between fructose and alcohol addictions and their 
negative consequences on health, including the inducement of metabolic diseases.  He 
concludes that, analogous to ethanol (alcohol), social efforts to reduce fructose 
consumption will be required in order to combat rising obesity.  Higher consumption 
levels of sugar invariably lead to a greater incidence of metabolic diseases across a 
population.  This conclusion is supported by Luc et al. (2010) who present a large body 
of evidence that a high-fructose diet is causal to obesity, diabetes, and dyslipidemia in 
laboratory animals.  Their paper concludes that consumption of sweetened beverages is 
directly associated with excess calorie intake, an increased risk of diabetes, and 
increased cardiovascular diseases through an increase in body weight.  They 
recommend limiting the daily intake of sugar-based calories.  As the majority of fructose 
in human diets is derived from sweetened beverages, there is a direct correlation 
between soda consumption and obesity. 
 Policies that address obesity levels are being discussed at greater length and new 





discussed by Philipson and Posner (2008) in their paper discussing the central themes of 
a decade of obesity research, may or may not be efficacious, but continue to be 
implemented or discussed by various local governments around the United States.  
Taxes, bans, and regulations may increase going forward, particularly given the ongoing 
discussions regarding health costs and outcomes.  This thesis’s contribution is to 
determine the impacts on the welfare of consumption related to the soda ban, and 






CHAPTER 2. THE MODEL 
In any pricing scheme, a principal makes pricing decisions based on relevant market 
factors, starting with their abilities to discriminate between consumers and consumers’ 
abilities to arbitrage.  For the context of this model, the soda market consists of retailers 
subject to health grades by the New York City of Health and Mental Hygiene; this 
includes food-service establishments such as restaurants, street-vendors, bowling alleys, 
and fast-food operations.  It does not include supermarkets and convenience-stores 
such as 7-Eleven.  In the case of the soda market, retailers may maintain some market 
power over price through moderate product differentiation, primarily taste, branding, 
and convenience, such as location.  Premium brand products sell for higher prices than 
store-brands or off-brand products, and location attributes, such as the proximity of 
competition, contribute to retailers’ abilities to price products.  However, to make 
pricing more challenging, there are few transaction costs or barriers to arbitrage 
between consumers, although a secondary market in soda is unlikely to develop.   More 
importantly, retailers are incapable of identifying the consumer’s type, meaning they 
need to develop a pricing scheme that incents consumers to self-identify by purchasing 





a rational profit maximizer, and thus wants to extract as much surplus from consumers 
as possible. 
To create the model, assume there are two types of consumers in the soda market: 
those who consume large amounts of soda, denoted as θH, and those who consume 
relatively smaller amounts of soda, denoted θL, The θH type consumer has a high 
willingness to pay and a correspondingly high elasticity, while the θL consumers have a 
lower willingness to pay and lower elasticity.  Ideally, the retailer would like to engage in 
first-degree price discrimination, in which the retailer charges each consumer their 
reservation price for soda; however, he cannot observe the consumer’s type or prevent 
arbitrage between consumers.  The retailer will therefore use second degree price 
discrimination to incent consumers to reveal their preferences through self-selection.  In 
other words, the consumer will choose a price/quantity bundle that maximizes her own 
utility. 
To determine the effects of a size ban, a traditional two-type nonlinear pricing 
model is used to maximize the retailers’ profits.  Each consumer has a utility function: 
U(i, q) = θiqi – pi, where i denotes either a high consumer, H, or low consumer, L, pi is the 
price each pays, qi is the quantity, and θi is a parameter indicating the consumer’s type. 
In all cases, θH > θL, in other words, the high type consumers always want to 
consume more soda than low type consumers.  This condition satisfies the single 
crossing property, implying monotonicity of the utility functions such that U(θH, q) – 





crossing property implies that 
        
  
   
        
  
.  A final, and important, assumption is 
the retailer’s cost function, c(q), is such that c’(q) > 0 and c’’(q) >0 meaning that cost is 
increasing and convex.   
 
2.1 Without The Ban 
Using the assumptions above, a profit maximization equation can be used to 
establish the optimal price-quantity combination in an unrestricted market, meaning 
before any ban is in place.  Taking the two-type profit maximization model from the 
literature and applying it here requires assigning the probability of encountering the 
consumer types; thus, θL consumers occur in proportion β and θH consumers occur in 
the corresponding proportion (1-β), such that if a consumer is not θL then they are by 
definition θH.  β is thus the probability of encountering a low type consumer and 
represents the percentage of the population denoted by θL. 
Given the assumption above, the retailer’s profit maximization equation is: 
(1.1)   MAXp,q   [        ]       [        ] s.t. 
             (P.C.) 
                    (I.C.) 
Equation 1.1 is the profit equation of the retailer subject to the participation constraint 
for the low type consumers and the incentive compatibility constraint for the high type 
consumers.  It is clear and well established in the literature (Tirole 1988) that as long as 





purchase decision) then the high types will also participate, implying that the low type 
participation constraint is binding.  Additionally, the literature establishes that the high 
type consumer’s incentive compatibility is binding because low types would receive 
negative utility from consumption of the high type bundle; therefore, the incentive 
compatibility constraint states that the high types must get greater utility from 
purchasing their bundle, making this the binding constraint. 
Letting these constraints hold with equality and solving them for price (pi) results 
in  
           (P.C.) 
and 
                      (I.C.) 
Substituting these expressions into the objective function results in 
(1.2)  MAXqi  [          ]       [                      ] 
which expresses price in terms of utility and allows for analysis of the problem using 
unconstrained optimization.  The first order Kuhn-Tucker Conditions are 
(1.3)       [         ]     
where      and 
  
   
    , 
and 
(1.4)   [         ]       [          ]     
where       and 
  
   





Given this set-up, there are two cases worthy of further exploration: case I, in which the 
retailer serves both types of consumers; and, case II, in which the retailer serves only 
high type consumers and stops serving low type consumers. 
 
2.1.1 Case I 
In the first case of interest, the retailer serves both types of consumers, implying 
that qH > 0 and qL > 0.  Under this condition, the first order conditions (1.3) and (1.4) 
hold with equality, thus  
(1.5)            and, 
(1.6)      
       
     
 
        
Thus, the retailer should choose to set the high type size equal to their first best amount, 
at which their marginal cost is equal to their marginal utility, and set the low types 
amount to be less than their optimal consumption quantity.  Equation (1.6) 
demonstrates that the cost of serving the low type consumers is increased by an 
amount equal to the information rent, 
     
 
       , required to serve the high types 
and maintain incentive compatibility.  The information rent, as shall be demonstrated, is 
a cost the retailer must pay to the high type consumers in order for them to purchase 
their own price/quantity bundle and not the bundle intended for the low types. 
Using equations (1.5) and (1.6) and the participation and incentive compatibility 
constraints, the optimal quantities can be derived for both types of consumers 
(1.7)           







(1.8)          
  
where   
  denotes the optimal quantity for each type, such that         
   if first-
degree price discrimination were possible.  Thus the low type consumers are left with no 
surplus as the retailer extracts it in its entirety.  Alternatively, the high type consumer’s 
price is discounted by the information rent, leaving them with positive net surplus.  This 
surplus is left to them in order to maintain incentive compatibility, as without it the high 
types could always purchase the bundle intended for low types and receive positive 
utility.  As a side note, this implies that           
           , in other words, the 
information rent must be greater than the utility high types would receive from 
purchasing the low types’ bundle.   
These equations also imply that changes in exogenous parameters, 
             will result in changes to the optimal prices and quantities, 
               .  Increases in    will result in increases in    and an increase in    
(because   
    
 ); and, increases in    will result in a decrease in    (holding other 
parameters constant) and increases in both           (again, holding other parameters 
constant).  In other words, the more heterogeneous the population of consumers 
becomes, the more the retailer will lower   .  As the population becomes more 
homogenous, the information rent required to get    consumers to purchase the 
bundle intended for them increases.  Additionally, an increase in the parameter   will 
result in an increase in   .  If the likelihood of encountering a low type consumer 





greater information rents.  Conversely, a decrease in   will result in a decrease in    in 
order to reduce the information rents required to maintain incentive compatibility with 
the high type consumers. 
This theoretical result is consistent with observed pricing behavior by retailers.  
Soda comes in a variety of sizes intended to satisfy the demands of multiple types of 
consumers – from small containers of 222 milliliters up to large containers of 2000 
milliliters.  Observationally, smaller sizes have become more prevalent in the market, 
indicating a strengthened preference for smaller soda sizes.  This change is represented 
in the model by an increase in    , accompanied by a decrease in    .  Large sizes are 
also present in the market, such as McDonald’s supersized soda, indicating a strong 
preference by some consumers for large soda sizes.  Increases in this preference, 
represented in the model by increases in   , leads to increases in   . 
 
2.1.2 Case II 
In the second case of interest, the retailer serves only the high type consumers, 
thus: qH > 0 and qL = 0.  This case allows the retailer to optimize price and quantity to 
provide the high groups with a first best choice.  It works when   is small enough (there 
are few low type consumers in the market).  As mentioned previously, the information 
rent increases the more homogenous the market becomes; there will thus be a 
boundary at which the profits from the low type consumers are too small to justify 





  [          ]       [          ], at which point    becomes zero.  In this 
case, the first order Kuhn-Tucker Conditions are 
(1.9)            
and 
(1.10)      
      
     
 
        
In this case, 1.10 demonstrates that qL is effectively zero because at any point the 
retailer would lose money serving the low type consumers.  Because there is no 
information rent required to induce high types to purchase their bundle, it also implies 
 (1.11)          
  
Because the retailer owes no information rent to high types, she can raise the price pH 
relative to the equilibrium in which both markets were served.  Any small changes in    
will only impact the high types price (pH) and quantity (clearly qL cannot get smaller than 
zero).  Alternatively, marginal changes in    or   will have no impact on prices or 
quantities until the changes are large enough to cause a switch back to Case I – in other 
words, at the point at which profits from serving low type consumers outweigh the 
required information rents. 
 
2.2 With The Ban 
There is increasingly a push by government actors to limit negative behavior by 
consumers.  The New York City soda ban by Mayor Bloomberg is one such example, and 





to implement various constraints beyond taxation.  The New York City ban limits the 
sale of sizes greater than sixteen ounces by any retailer subject to health inspections.  
To compare this to the outcomes of unconstrained sales, the original profit equation is 
modified to include an additional size constraint 
(1.12)   MAXp,q   [        ]       [        ] s.t. 
             (P.C.) 
                    (I.C.) 
       (Size Constraint) 
In which    represents the maximum size permitted by regulation.  In this case, it 
should be assumed that    is smaller than    in order to make the constraint binding.  
Clearly, were it larger than the preferred soda size of high type consumers, it would 
have no impact on price and quantity combinations, and the results would be the same 
as in in the unrestricted cases above.  
The new constraint can be added to the original problem (1.2) to yield 
(1.13)  MAXqi  [          ]       [                      ] s.t. 
      
  
And the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions are 
(1.14)         
   where     
  
and 
(1.15)   [         ]       [          ]     
where       and 
  
   





In the presence of a size constraint, or soda ban, the retailer has four choices: to stop 
serving any consumer group, or shut-down, a choice we can discard given that positive 
profits are still available; to serve both consumer types through multiple sizes 
conformed to meet the size regulations; to serve only the high type consumers, making 
    ; or, to serve both consumer types using a one-size-fits-all strategy.  Each of these 
final three strategies will be examined in greater detail.  It is possible that the ban 
induces a change in regime such that the retailer may switch from serving both 
consumer types with a menu of options (Case A) to serving only high-type consumers 
(Case B) or a one-size fits all strategy (Case C).  This possibility and its conditions are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
2.2.1 Case A 
In the first scenario, the retailer decides to serve both consumer types through a 
menu of drinks.  This case is analogous to Case I above, except in its incorporation of the 
ban.  In this scenario,        
 , and equation (1.14) is non-binding and strictly 
positive.  Equation (1.15) holds with equality such that   
  satisfies the equation 
    
       
     
 
        from Case I above. 
This implies that under a ban, if a retailer chooses to provide multiple sizes in order 
to serve the same two consumer groups 
a.    will be unaffected by the ban, 





c.   
  will decrease to   
 , implying a decline in the quantity sold to    types, and, 
d.    will commensurately decrease from         
             
  to 
        
             
 . 
 
2.2.2 Case B 
In this case, the retailer decides to serve only    type consumers, similar to Case 
II above.  As in Case II,     , however, neither equation (1.14) nor equation (1.15) 
hold with strict equality, and   
    .  In this scenario, the retailer has decided that 
profits from the    type consumers are less than the required information rent being 
paid to    type consumers. 
 Intuitively, if   
  has dropped to   
 , then the price paid by    consumers will fall 
from  
    
      
  to   
      
  
This situation may occur when   is small or the information rent is large.   
 
2.2.3 Case C 
This final case demonstrates a possible outcome under the ban that is not a 
profit maximizing retailer choice in an unrestricted market.  Suppose the ban is of the 
form      , but   
    , and the retailer chooses to serve both markets using a one-
size-fits-all strategy.  This would occur if    were sufficiently small so as to be very close 
to   





To find the optimal price and quantity, the retailer would solve  
(1.16)  MAX             
           
Because    types will always purchase as long as    types purchase, their participation 
constraint is not binding, and thus not included.  Because the retailer wants to capture 
the entire available consumer surplus, the participation constraint is binding, holding 
with equality.  Substituting the constraint into the profit function leads to the new 
maximization equation 
(1.17)  MAX          
and the first order condition 
(1.18)           
The first order condition indicates that the retailer will make the one-size-fits-all 
container to match the first best choice for the    type consumers.  The participation 
constraint yields the optimal price of      
   .  Despite the subscripts L, the price and 
quantity combination will be sold to both high    and low    types of consumers.  The 
subscript indicates that the price quantity combination happens to also be the first best 
options for the low type consumer.  Under this pricing scheme, the ban is not binding 
because     
 .  
As mentioned above, this circumstance is very unlikely in the absence of a size 
constraint.  Again, a trip to a retailer will confirm this: there are many sizes available.  It 
must be true, therefore, that retailers find greater profit in segmenting the market and 





strictly binding and low enough ban, this could be an optimal choice.  This is further 
explored in the welfare and profit analyses below. 
 
2.3 Pricing Strategy And Profits 
Previously, the thesis has explored two potential price strategies without a ban 
and three strategies with a ban in place.  In both scenarios, a retailer could choose to 
serve both consumer types with a menu of options or serve only high type consumers.  
Additionally, if a ban is in place, a retailer could choose to serve both consumer types 
with a single size.   
It is easy to see what retailers choose to do in an unregulated situation by going to 
a local food-service establishment where many sizes are available for consumption.  To 
determine what retailers would do under a ban requires analyzing their profits. 
Because it is known that retailers currently offer a menu of options to serve 
multiple consumer types, it poses the question: would a retailer continue this strategy 
under a ban or would the ban incent them to switch to a different price strategy?  Each 
case has a profit expression to help answer this 
(1.19)      [    
      
  ]       [    
           
   (  
 )] 
(1.20)          [    
   (  
 )] 
and 
(1.21)     [    
      





In Case A the retailer continues to serve both consumer types using a menu of options 
that conform to the ban.  It was shown that    and    are unaffected by a ban which 
limits only   ; however,   
  and therefore   
  will decrease.  Therefore, the retailer will 
switch strategies if and only if: 
(1.22)         [    
   (  
 )]      [    
      
  ]       [    
  
                                  (  
 )] 
which reduces to 
(1.23)       [     ]  
   [    
      
  ] 
This clearly indicates that a retailer will switch strategies from a menu of options to 
serving only high types if and only if the profits from serving the low type consumers 
(the left hand side of the expression) are less than the information rents required to 
incent the high types to purchase their bundle (the right hand side of the expression).  It 
is noteworthy that the equation (1.23) does not rely on   , indicating that this choice is 
independent of the ban as long as the constraint does not impact    and   .  The 
retailer decision then is based on the size of   and the heterogeneity of the population.  
As   increases the profits from low type consumers increase and the retailer is more 
likely to serve them through a menu of options. 
As noted previously, it can be casually observed that the profit from serving low 
type consumers is greater than the information rents paid to high type consumers. 
In the event of a ban, retailers also face the choice of switching from Cases A or B, 





C, serving both consumer types with a one-size-fits-all strategy.  Again, the answer 
depends on profit levels 
(1.24)                
Using equations (1.19), (1.20), and (1.21) above, the expression becomes 
(1.25)    [    
      
  ]           [    
      
  ]       [    
  
                                  (  
 )]          [    
   (  
 )]  
In this situation, the ban works through the right hand side of the equation.  As the ban 
becomes more binding, placing downward pressure on   , the right hand side becomes 
smaller making the transition to Case C more likely. 
It is interesting to note that while most establishments do not use the one-size-
fits-all price strategy, there is an industry using something similar.  Many full service 
restaurants have only one size of soft drink available to seated patrons, for which they 
charge the optimal amount.  In most of these cases, the drink comes with unlimited free 
refills.  This is a one-size-fits-all pricing strategy by which low type consumers consume 
less and high type consumers consume more, although both pay the same price and 
have the option of consuming their optimal amount.  It is questionable whether this is 
profit maximizing for the retailer or is in fact a bundling choice knowing that patrons will 
also be ordering food items. 
If the ban were binding such that it pushed    and    too close together, more 






2.4 Welfare Impacts 
To analyze changes in welfare, this thesis starts with the unregulated (no ban) 
Case I, in which retailers choose to segment the market and serve both consumer types 
with their own bundle.  This choice is clear: it is observable that this is the primary 
pricing strategy retailers currently employ in the market.  Therefore, the ban will induce 
them to select one of three possible strategies: continue segmenting the market; serve 
only high types; or, serve both types with a one-size-fits-all pricing strategy.  This section 
analyzes the welfare effects on retailers and consumers for all three potential outcomes. 
In Case A the retailer chooses to continue using a market segmentation strategy.  
As noted above, the profit expression (1.2) represents the case in which the retailer is 
unrestricted and (1.19) the case in which a ban is present 
(1.2)      [    
      
  ]       [                
       ] 
(1.19)      [    
      
  ]       [    
           
   (  
 )] 
The notable difference in the equation is the decrease of    to   
 , implying that the 
price paid by    type consumers has also dropped.  As there is no change in profits from 
the    type consumers, the retailer loses profits from high types and experiences an 
unequivocal drop in welfare under the ban, demonstrated by the expression  
(1.26)       
           
   (  
 )                   
         
which reduces to 
(1.27)  {     
   (  





The left hand side of the equation is strictly less than the right hand side under a strictly 
binding ban, indicating a loss of welfare for retailers. 
Consumer welfare, defined previously as U(i, q) = θiqi – pi, does not change for 
low type consumers who are still offered the same price/quantity combination. 
According to the incentive compatibility constraint, the retailer is able to capture the 
entire consumer surplus of the low types; therefore, they are no worse or better off 
under the ban.  The following expressions demonstrate changes for the high type 
consumers 
(1.28)                   where 
                    
  
Therefore, utility for high types is equal to 
(1.29)                [               
 ]  
which reduces to 
(1.30)                     
  
which is equal to the information rent obtained by high type consumers.  As the 
information rent is not dependent on   , high type consumers experience no aggregate 
change in welfare.  In other words, they still capture the same information rent as 
surplus as they did before the ban.  In this case, all of the welfare losses are born by the 






In Case B the retailer decides to serve only the high type consumers in the 
market, implying      and     .  In this case, the retailer’s profit is described by 
expression (1.20) 
(1.20)          [    
   (  
 )]  
The question is, how does this change from the unrestricted profit  
(1.2)      [    
      
  ]       [                
       ]? 
The answer depends on the size of  .  As   gets smaller the profit from the low group 
decreases.  At a point,   will become small enough that the retailer will decide to serve 
only high types and eliminate the information rent payment.  In the current market, 
where it is known that   is large enough to justify the information rent paid to high 
types,    is likely less than   , otherwise retailers would already have adopted this 
strategy.  It is clear then that retailers would suffer a welfare loss. 
Low type consumers were originally given zero surplus as the retailer would 
extract all of it as profit.  Therefore, a retailer decision not to serve them would have no 
effect on low type’s surplus.  In practice it is likely that retailers would choose to leave 
low type consumers some very small amount of surplus in order to incent them to 
purchase as opposed to leaving them indifferent.  In this case, it may be that low type 
consumers suffer a very marginal amount of welfare loss.   
High type consumers on the other hand experience an unequivocal reduction in 
welfare.  Their original welfare from expression (1.30) was 






However, because the retailer would no longer pay them the information rent, the price 
paid by high type consumers would extract all of their welfare 
(1.32)    
      
  and 
(1.33)    (    
 )      
      
    
Therefore, high type consumers are made unequivocally worse off under the new 
pricing scheme by an amount equal to the information rent,           
 , which they 
were once paid in order to incent them to purchase their intended bundle. 
Finally, in Case C the retailer chooses to serve both consumer groups with a one-
size-fits-all pricing strategy.  As already stated, the retailer received profit    (1.2) under 
their current pricing strategy.  Expression (1.21) gives the profit under the one-size-fits-
all strategy 
(1.21)     [    
      
  ] 
If the retailer chose this pricing strategy, it could be said that   was large enough that 
the retailer wants to serve both consumer types, therefore 
(1.34)     [    
      
  ]           [    
   (  
 )] 
The only way in which  
(1.35)     [    
      
  ]      [          ]       [          
                                           
       ] 
is if   is sufficiently large that the retailer wants to give low type consumers their first 





low types outweighs the drop in profits from high type consumers minus the no longer 
needed information rents, then retailers will see a gain in welfare. 
Observationally, it is unlikely this is the case, that retailers would find it more 
profitable to generally serve both consumer types with one size.  However, as previously 
noted, there are some circumstances under which retailers serve drinks in exactly this 
fashion, namely, full service restaurants. 
Low type consumers would receive their first best option where  
(1.36)         
       
    
  and  
    
      
  
Implying that low type consumers again receive zero surplus resulting in no change in 
welfare.  
High type consumers would be left with some welfare 
(1.37)         
       
    
  
because the participation constraint is not binding 
(1.38)      
    
      
  
Whether or not they are better off depends on the size of the surplus they get from 
purchasing the low types’ first best option versus the size of the information rent paid 
under the no ban situation.    
(1.39)      
      
             
If the left hand side is larger than the right hand side, the high type consumers would be 





In every case the low type consumers experience no change as the retailer 
appropriates their entire surplus.  In almost every case the retailer and high type 
consumers experience reduced welfare under the ban: the retailer through losses in 
revenues and the high type consumer through losses of the information rent.  Many of 
the solutions depend on   being sufficiently large or the population being sufficiently 
heterogeneous  that the retailer has an incentive to continue serving the low type 
consumers.  Under the current, casually observable population parameters, in which the 
retailer has an incentive to serve low type consumers, the retailer is unlikely to be made 





CHAPTER 3. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This thesis first examined two potential cases, Case I and Case II, in an unregulated 
market: retailers would serve both consumer types with a menu of options; or, retailers 
would serve only high type consumers.  A casual observation clearly indicates that 
producers and retailers generally use Case I, to serve all consumer types with a menu of 
options.  This provides the underlying insight that it is profit maximizing to do so, rather 
than to focus on one consumer segment.  The thesis then examined three possible cases, 
Cases A, B, and C, in a size constrained market, respectively: to continue serving 
consumers with a menu of options; to serve only high type consumers with one size; or, 
to serve both consumer types with a one-size-fits-all strategy.  A fourth option, to 
shutdown, was discarded based on the presence of available profits even after a ban.  
Using comparative statics, the thesis determined how changes in exogenous variables 
would lead to changes in the pricing scheme.  Following the cases was a welfare analysis 
comparing each of the three ban cases to the current market conditions: unrestricted 
menu pricing. 
There are three exogenous variables that impact the price-quantity decision by 
retailers:   ,    and  .  In case A, the retailer continues to offer the menu of choices 
and experiences a drop in profits as    falls to   
  after   
  falls to   





Case I, the unrestricted menu, to Case A, the restricted menu, the retailer unequivocally 
experiences a drop in profits.  Low type consumers experience no change in welfare, as 
the retailer will continue to capture their surplus; high type consumers will also 
experience no change in welfare, as the information rent paid to them is not dependent 
on the constraint.  In this case, the reduction in welfare is born entirely by the retailer.   
The decision to switch from Case A to Case B or C under the ban relies on their 
respective profit levels.  If the retailer decides to continue offering a menu of choices 
after the ban, it is because                .  Profit levels are determined by the size 
of  , the proportion of low type consumers in the market, and the heterogeneity of the 
population.  The larger   is the more the retailer is willing to pay the information rents 
to serve both consumer types with a menu of sizes.  If a decrease in   creates a 
situation in which profit from low type consumers is less than the information rents paid 
to the high types, the retailer will switch to a strategy of serving only the high type 
consumers.  In this case, the retailer will certainly generate smaller profits than an 
unrestricted menu of options would provide, illustrated by Case I; however, they would 
generate greater profits than a restricted menu of options, illustrated by Case A.  
Additionally, while low type consumers would experience no change in welfare, high 
type consumers would experience a loss of welfare as retailers moved to capture the 
entire consumer surplus. 
Retailers could also make a decision to serve all consumer groups through a one-
size-fits-all price strategy.  In this case, retailers are certainly worse off than the 





option over Cases A and B requires understanding their profit levels: in this case, 
              .  It can be observationally noted that retailers do not necessarily 
find this the most profitable case in an unrestricted market, implying they would suffer a 
decline in welfare in a shift from Case I to Case C.  Determining if they would use the 
one-size-fits-all strategy in the restricted market requires knowing the strength of the 
ban.  If the ban is sufficiently close to   
  (in other words, if   
    
  is small), and the 
retailer finds it profitable to serve both groups, implying      , then the retailer will 
opt to provide a first best option to low type consumers and to commensurately charge 
them their entire surplus.  This leaves low type consumers with no change in welfare as 
the retailer is able to confiscate it in its entirety.  High type consumers, on the other 
hand, may experience a decrease or an increase in welfare depending on the original 
size of the information rent and the welfare they receive purchasing a smaller option at 
the low types’ price.  If     
      
             is true, then high types are better 
off; alternatively, if it is not true, then they are worse off.  In an unrestricted market, 
offering low types their first best options would require offering high types a larger 
information rent to maintain incentive compatibility.  It is likely then that aggregate 
welfare declines in a switch from Case I to Case C as retailers lose profit, low types 
experience no change, and high types remain ambiguous. 
There are unambiguous declines in welfare for retailers, who lose profit, and in 
some cases for consumers.  The only case of a potential gain in welfare for any group of 





they keep more of their consumer surplus by purchasing the low type bundle at the low 
type price than the information rent they keep under Case I.  Therefore, consumers and 
retailers are more likely to experience aggregate declines in welfare in almost any case.  
This is driven by retailer losses in profit and overall consumer reductions in welfare.  
Low type consumers are unlikely to experience any changes in welfare as they can still 
purchase the bundles offered to them and will pay all of their welfare to do so – 
meaning they will continue to appropriate zero or near zero levels of surplus. 
In Cases A and C, both consumer types continue to purchase soda.  It is possible 
in Case A that less soda is purchased overall; while low-type prices do not change, high-
type prices and quantities decline, indicating reduced consumption.  In Case C, the 
change in total soda consumption is ambiguous as low-type consumers may consume 
more by receiving their first-best size option, while high-type consumers may consume 
less as they are receiving a less-than optimal amount of soda.  In Case B, low type 
consumers are excluded from the market, indicating a reduction in total soda purchases.  
Two of the cases presented unambiguously indicate that consumption will fall under a 
ban.  Given the evidence of a link between sweetened beverages and obesity (Luc 2010), 
reduced consumption would indicate an improvement in health outcomes.  If a ban 
reduced total soda consumption, and thereby decreased spending on diet and obesity 
related diseases, it would essentially act as a transfer of welfare from soda retailers to 
the larger society, which may pay less for healthcare and experience improved levels of 





This thesis can conclude that retailers will likely suffer reductions in profit under 
a ban.  It can also conclude that low-type consumers’ consumption welfare will be left 
unaffected; however, their consumption could remain the same (Case A), decrease 
(Case B), or increase (Case C), indicating ambiguous health outcomes through reduced 
consumption.  Finally, the thesis can conclude that high type consumers will experience 
either no change in consumption welfare with reduced consumption (Case A), reduced 
consumption welfare with reduced consumption (Case B), or ambiguous changes in 
consumption welfare with reduced consumption (Case C).  In many of the cases, 
therefore, the total quantity of soda consumed is reduced (Case C remains ambiguous).  
Given the strong link between the consumption of sweetened beverages and obesity, if 
aggregate consumption of soda declines, it is likely that health would improve through 
reduced incidence of obesity and its accompanying metabolic disorders.  Additionally, in 
only one case is it clear that the ban negatively impacts consumer’s welfare of 
consumption (high type consumers in Case B).  Therefore, the argument made by many 
of the ban’s opponents, claiming reduced consumption welfare, is only true under one 
potential scenario.  In the most likely post-ban scenario, Case A, consumption welfare 
would be unchanged.  In general, the welfare of consumption is not made worse off 
under a ban. 
Future research should look to determine potential healthcare cost reductions or 
societal gains from bans, something this thesis does not claim to quantitatively study.  
Additionally, further research is necessary to determine if tax policy can be used to 





explores the welfare of consumption, it excludes analyzing substitution effects, which 
may lead consumers to substitute equally unhealthy behaviors for soda consumption, 
negating the intended health outcomes of a ban.  Alternatively, consumers could find 
perfect substitutes at alternative locations unaffected by the ban.  Finally, future 
modeling could incorporate a parameter indicating a “love of diversity,” such that 
consumers gain utility from being offered choices.  In not including such a parameter, 













LIST OF REFERENCES 
Baron, D. &. (1982, July). Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs. Econometrica, 
50(4), 911-930. 
Binkley, J. &. (2003). Consumer Price Awareness in Food Shopping: the Case of Quantity 
Surcharges. Journal of Retailing, 79, 27-35. 
Brownell, K., Farley, T., Willett, W. C., Popkin, B. M., Chaloupka, F. J., Thompson, J. W., et 
al. (2009, October). The Public Health and Economic Benefits of Taxing Sugar-
Sweetened Beverages. New England Journal of Medicine, 361(16), 1599-1605. 
Cakir, M. &. (2013). Consumer Response to Package Downsizing: Evidence from the 
Chicago Ice Cream Market. Journal of Retailing, xx. 
Chen, S. E. (2012, April). An Exploration of the Relationship Between Income and Eating 
Behavior. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 41(1), 82-91. 
Cohen, A. (2008). Package Size and Price Discrimination in the Paper Towel Market. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26, 502-516. 
DeNavas-Walt, C. B. (2012). Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the 
United States: 2011. Population Report, U.S. Census Bureau. 
Dobson, P. &. (2010, July-August). For a Few Cents More: Why Supersize Unhealthy 
Food? Marketing Science, 29(4), 770-778. 
Elbel, B. R. (2009). Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the Effects on Low-
Income People in New York City. NYC: Health Affairs. 
Faulkner, G. E. (2011). Economic Instruments for Obesity Prevention: Results of a 
Scoping Review and Modified Delphi Survey. International Journal of Behavioral 





 Fernandes, M. M. (2012, March). Effect of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP) on Frequency of Beverage Consumption among Youth in the 
United States. Journal of the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, 112(8), 1241-
1246. 
Gibbard, A. (1973, July). Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. 
Econometrica, 41(4), 587-601. 
Koster, E. (2009). Diversity in the Determinants of Food Choice: A Psychological 
Perspective. Food Quality and Preference, 20, 70-82. 
Kuhn, H. &. (1951). Nonlinear Programming. Proceedings of the Second Berkeley 
Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability (pp. 481-492). Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Lowenstein, G. T. (2007, November). Asymmetic Paternalism to Improve Health 
Behaviors. Journal of the American Medical Association, 298(20), 2415-2417. 
Lusk, J. L. (2010). Welfare Effects of Food Labels and Bans with Alternative Willingness to 
Pay Measures. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 32(2), 319-337. 
Lustig, R. (2010). Fructose: Metabolic, Hedonic, and Societal. Journal of the American 
Dietetic Association, 110, 1307-1321. 
Madden, D. (2013). The Poverty Effects of a 'Fat-Tax' in Ireland. Health Economics, 
DOI.10.1002/hec.3006, online. 
Maskin, E. &. (1984, Summer). Monopoly with Incomplete Information. The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 15(2), 171-196. 
Miao, Z. B. (2013). Accounting for Product Substitution in the Analysis of Food Taxes 
Targeting Obesity. Health Economics, 22, 1328-1343. 
Mussa, M. &. (1978, August). Monopoly and Product Quality. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 18, 301-317. 
Myerson, R. B. (1979, January). Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. 





Philipson, T. &. (2008). Is the Obesity Epidemic a Public Health Problem? A Decade of 
Research on the Economics of Obesity. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Salanie, B. (2005). The Economics of Contracts. Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press. 
Tappy, L., Le, K., Tran, C., & Paquot, N. (2010). Fructose and metabolic diseases: New 
findings, new questions. Nutrition, 26, 1044-1049. 
Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 1(1), 39-60. 
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T Press. 
Triall, W. B. (2012). Economic Perspectives on Nutrition Policy Evaluation. Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 63(3), 505-527. 
Wansink, B. (1996). Can Package Size Accelerate Usage Volume? Journal of Marketing, 
60(3), 1-14. 
Wilson BM, S.-F. S. (2013, April). Regulating the Way to Obesity: Unintended 
Consequences of Limiting Sugary Drink Sizes. Plos One, 8(4), e61081. 
Zheng, Y., McLaughlin, E., & Kaiser, H. (2012, December). Taxing Food and Beverages: 















Brian A. Bourquard 
Graduate School, Purdue University 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
 
Education 
B.A., Business Administration, Seattle University, Seattle, Washington 
M.S., Management Consulting, Grenoble Ecole de Management, Grenoble, France 
M.S. Candidate, Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 
 
Professional Experience 
WestWater Research LLC, Research Associate – 2013 to present 
Purdue University, Research Assistant – 2012 to 2013 
Grenoble Ecole de Management, Graduate Consultant – 2011 to 2012 
Ryther Child Center, Residential Counselor – 2010 to 2011 
U.S. Bank, Universal Banker – 2007 to 2008 
 
Teaching Experience 
Spring 2013 – Purdue University – Teaching Assistant: AGEC 686 (MS/MBA program), 
Strategic Food and Agribusiness Management (Supervisor: Dr. Allan Gray) 
Spring 2013 – Purdue University – Teaching Assistant: AGEC 430, Agricultural and Food 
Business Strategy (Supervisor: Dr. Allan Gray) 
Fall 2012 – Purdue University – Teaching Assistant: AGEC 430, Agricultural and Food 
Business Strategy (Supervisor: Dr. Brent Gloy) 
 
Research Interests 
Industrial Organization and Pricing Theory 
Business and Organizational Development, Nonprofit and NGO Management 
 
Selected Projects 
Water Basin Implementation Plan, Colorado, USA, February – July 2014 
Hydropower Installation Valuation, Oregon, USA, February 2014 
Water Marketing Analysis, Oregon, USA, February 2014 






Water Right Valuation, Oregon, USA – October 2013 
Consultant – Shamba Tea, Walla Walla, WA, Mar. 2012 – May 2012 
Project Manager – Vinci Codex, Grenoble, France, Nov. 2011 – Feb. 2012 
Partnership Innovator – Capgemini, Grenoble, France, Nov. 2011 – Dec. 2012 
Moderator/Master of Ceremonies – Mobility Conference, France, Feb. 2012 
Editor – Semiconductor Industry Analysis – AMD, Germany, May 2012 
Balanced Score Card – TRI Hospitality Consulting, U.K., October 2011 
Code of Ethics and Conduct – Groupe Alphard, Canada, November 2011 
 
Publications 
Bourquard, B., Landry, C. (2013). Of Droughts and Tunnels – California’s Mega Water 
Project. Water Resources Impact, 15(6). 
Bourquard, B., Landry, C. (Forthcoming 2014). Environmental Water Markets in the 
Western United States. Water Insider, March, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
